aerodynamically clean airplane were found to far outweigh the relatively small increases in weight." Though in the end correct, this statement suggests that the desirability of the retractable gear was obvious and subject to simple and straightforward engineering assessment. Walter Boyne, in his semipopular The Leading Edge, casts his net wider, mentioning, in various contexts, the sporadic, anticipatory use of retractable gear on an assortment of early airplanes: J. W. Martin's Kitten of 1917 (which was incapable of flight), the Dayton Wright RB-1 of 1920 (a remarkably advanced design generally for its day), and the Verville Sperry R-3 of 1922. Though increasing speed and other factors are likewise mentioned, adoption in the 1930s appears as an essentially foresighted progression, first to a variety of streamlined fairings for a fixed undercarriage, and then to the clearly "ideal solution" of the retractable gear. The main unknown in the last step was what sort of gearing, actuating mechanism, and the like, to use for retraction. The question was thus not whether a retractable landing gear ought to be used-that was self-evident; the problem for the engineer was how best to achieve this end structurally and mechanically. Views such as these, I submit, underlie the usual historical references to the retractable gear. monoplane, described at the time as a "flying wing." Though the pilot and engine were indeed enclosed within the unusually thick wing, the craft had in fact a tail supported by twin booms.5 At the beginning of 1930, Avion became a division of United Aircraft and Transport Corporation, an aviation holding company, and its name was changed to the Northrop Aircraft Corporation. This turned out to be the first of a succession of three companies to bear the Northrop name. With these companies, Northrop led the design of a number of notable airplanes. He is probably best remembered for his giant experimental (true-)flying-wing bomber of the late 1940s. 6 The Northrop airplanes that concern us here, however, are the Greek-letter series coincident with-indeed, part of-the airframe revolution. The Northrop Alpha ( fig. 3 ) inaugurated the series in March of 1930. Like the contemporary Boeing Monomail, the Alpha featured stressed-skin all-metal construction equal or superior to previous wooden structures in terms of strength in relation to weight. Where the Monomail's wing used more or less conventional (though aluminum) truss-type spars and ribs, however, the Alpha's wing was made up throughout from aluminum sheet, cut and formed into channel-shaped elements for the spanwise and chordwise components of the internal frame. These were then riveted to one another and to the wing skin to form, in effect, an assembly of contiguous, more or less rectangular, boxes. This relatively light, inexpensive, and rugged multicellular structure, which Northrop had employed also on the Avion "flying wing," was described by Aviation magazine as a "radical and promising innovation." Probably Northrop's most important contribution to aeronautics, it was imitated, with modifications, in the Douglas DC-series and later aircraft. The Alpha differed from other craft in the airframe revolution, however, by retaining a fixed landing gear. In its initial version, this gear had the unstreamlined tripod (or split-axle) arrangement common on other airplanes of the time (see fig. 3 ). Transcontinental and Western Air (TWA), forerunner of Trans World Airlines, acquired thirteen Alphas of this type. These it used successfully, beginning in 1931, to establish twenty-four-hour mail service between New York and Los Angeles.8 Jack Northrop, a self-described "nut about streamlining,"9 was not unaware, of course, of the aerodynamic attractions of retractable gear. reporting on design progress on the Alpha to a technical advisory committee of United Aircraft, he indicated further that "a retractile [sic] gear is being designed to be incorporated later." (Terminology, as well as type of gear, had yet to be standardized.) Though events themselves were complicated, use of retractable gear was clearly Northrop's intention ultimately for the Alpha.'? By mid-1930, his ideas were evidently changing. In May, in a second report to the advisory committee, he mentioned, not only the "retractile" gear, but a new "pants-type" gear as well. To assess this carefully streamlined fixed gear, Northrop had wind-tunnel tests conducted in late 1930 on a model of the Alpha (fig. 4) (The various aspects of a possible category of operating costs I take to be subsumed under performance and maintenance. An unavoidable element of arbitrariness exists in any classification of this sort.) If aerodynamic performance-that is, reduction of drag-were the sole consideration, the retractable gear, which eliminates landing-gear drag entirely, would be the immediate, obvious choice. It is in this sense that the usual view sees such gear as the "ideal solution." In fact, the additional requirements cannot be ignored. With regard to performance in relation to weight, a retractable gear invariably weighs more than a well-designed fixed gear for the same situation, and this weight must be supported by an increase in lift. Producing this lift in turn creates drag that tends to offset the gain from retraction. The resulting trade-off can be calculated on the basis of theoretical equations well understood in Northrop's time.13 Knowledge about cost, reliability, and maintenance, however, can come only from experience with construction and operation of a new gear when the design departs appreciably from the normal. Designers have to project such matters as best they can, but their projections are unavoidably fallible. As with most engineering problems in the real world, the overall task is complex.
Evidence suggests that Northrop was alert to all these considerations. Whether he in fact calculated the trade-off between weight and performance is impossible to say-design analyses of this sort rarely survive for long. Writing to Jack Frye, operations chief for TWA, he did say regarding the modified Alpha that "both take-off and cruising speeds were appreciably better in our tests in spite of the additional load of 350 lbs. used with the new [i.e., pants-type] gear." Concern for cost, reliability, and especially weight is implicit in a statement, in his previously mentioned article on the "flying wing," that design of a retractable gear "is exceedingly difficult due to the high [landing] loads involved." The interrelated demands of all five requirements (cost, reliability, and maintenance subsumed in effect under "simplicity") appear in the following passage from a Northrop sales brochure from a few years later: "Carefully developed streamlining provides an aerodynamic efficiency in the Northrop gear almost equal to full retraction but with greater simplicity and much less weight." A second brochure contains a full paragraph detailing the maintenance virtues of the Northrop gear.14 Northrop, however, had a special concern, stemming from the additional fact that a retractable gear needs space for stowage when retracted. According to an interview with the prominent designer Edward Heinemann, who worked as a young engineer on the Alpha, he-Northrop-was uneasy about the effect of this requirement on his innovative wing structure. Providing space to stow the retracted gear inside the low wing-the aerodynamically preferred place to put it-would require interrupting the multicellular arrangement, and Northrop was reluctant to do this. He had gone to great effort to keep the structure light and simple, and providing sufficient strength in the presence of such interruption might compromise this achievement. The fact that the prospective stowage space tested at Caltech took the form of a streamlined enclosure under the wing supports this contention. When the Caltech tests showed the pants-type gear to give almost as much drag reduction as would retraction into this enclosure, Northrop's course was presumably clear. A carefully streamlined pants-type fairing over a relatively light, tubular, load-carrying structure gave him a reliable, low-drag, easily maintained, low-cost landing gear that did not require compromising the wing structure. 15 As it happened, the pants-type gear appeared first, not on the Alpha, but on the Northrop Beta ( fig. 5 ) in April 1931. This elegant two-seat sport monoplane, for a complex of reasons, never went into production.'6 After further encouraging tests at Caltech in the early summer,'7 the pants-type gear-now and subsequently called a "trouser" gear-was installed on existing Alphas starting in September. indicate that, as speed increases, the drag penalty from carrying the additional weight of the retractable gear becomes progressively smaller relative to the gain from retraction.21 This shifting trade-off doubtless had influence. At the same time, experience with cost, reliability, and maintenance was being accumulated-demonstrably encouraging in the case of reliability (see below) -and engineers were becoming more ingenious in their structural and mechanical designs. For Northrop, this ingenuity included ways to avoid compromising his multicellular wing structure. All these things could have influenced him to move into what the usual view sees as the obvious mainstream of development.
In the context of the usual view-that introduction of the retractable landing gear was a foresighted progression toward an essentially preordained outcome-the Northrop episode does seem a curious anomaly. Northrop's persistence with a fixed gear looks to be a temporary deviation from an engineering mainstream, a consequence, in part, of concern for his new multicellular wing structure. That, at least, is how things appeared until I dug deeper into contemporary events. The "anomaly" interpretation, I soon realized, oversimplifies the historical context.
A More General View
The oversimplification becomes apparent from two bodies of evidence: the airplanes and research efforts of the time and the writings of contemporary engineers. To go fully into these matters would be part of the book imagined in the introduction. The following overview, I believe, covers the essentials.
As 
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The Retractable Airplane Landing Gear Writings in engineering publications suggest the considerations going through designers' minds. In his magazine article on the "flying wing" quoted earlier, Northrop, after noting the theoretical gains from mechanical retraction, added: "but a tremendous amount of thought has been given to the problem and it still remains essentially unsolved." John G. Lee of the Chance Vought Corporation, in an article on the "Relation of Design to Airplane Maintenance" in the SAE Journal in 1932, likewise described the landing-gear problem as "now being fought out." He observed that "no absolutely reliable retracting mechanism has really been designed," that "maintenance problems ... with a retractable gear are severe," and that "the whole situation may be regarded as strictly experimental." Frank T. Courtney, a consulting test pilot writing on "Air-Transport-Design Economy . .." in the same journal and year, also viewed the retractable gear skeptically. In his view, the structural economy of a fixed gear doing double duty as part of the supporting structure for an externally braced wing might "lead to at least as great over-all efficiency . .., with an additional saving in What, then, can we say by way of answer to our question from the introduction? Certainly-and contrary to my earlier supposition-to recast the question in terms of an aberration from a rationally self-evident path misreads the issue. To the design community at the time, retraction was far from "so clearly the way to go." Northrop's trouser gear, conspicuous for a while, was in no way an anomaly in an otherwise linearly ordered pattern (hence the quotation marks in this article's title). Designers experimented with various kinds of fixed gear along with retraction, and the outcome seemed far from preordained at the time. I shall contend later that the retractable gear had a kind of technical imperative in light of the large, overall increase in speed that a combination of advances would eventually open up-no high-performance airplane is imaginable today without it. Designers in the early 1930s, however, lived in a world of small, progressive speed increments coming from loosely related changes in various components of the vehicle. Northrop, when he adopted the trouser gear, did not see it as a stopgap measure. Hall Hibbard, despite encouraging experience with retractable gear at Lockheed, did not regard his competitor's solution as misconceived or unpromising for development. The community of designers was feeling its way into the future in a state of knowledge in which engineering assessment was, at best, problematic. The technical imperative of the retractable gear is knowledge after the fact. We see the outcome; designers at the time, by their own testimony, did notforesee it.
Having said that, we can return to the original question. The events we have traced, however, suggest that it be broadened: how was it that Northrop-and his fellow designers-proceeded as they did in adopting retraction? The answer to this question, which emerges also from our account, has general implications for the processes of learning A detail of semantics, however, needs attention. For Campbell, the modifier "blind" denotes that in any search for knowledge that is truly new-that is, not arrived at before-candidate variants must, almost by definition, go "beyond the limits of foresight or prescience."36 I think of the seeker for knowledge as rather like a blind person trying to reach a desired destination by going down an unfamiliar passageway, using tactile input from a cane and the constraint available from the passage's sidewall. Though the person is not without guidance, whether the passage goes where desired or turns out a blind alley cannot be foreseen; it can be learned only by proceeding along "blindly" (though, note, not "randomly" or "unpremeditatedly" or "unconstrainedly") to the end. Though not without virtues, this use of "blind" causes problems. Some readers seem determined to equate it with "random." Others feel, with some justification, that when applied to technology (or science), it denies the characteristic goal orientation and "directedness" of such activity. As a reader of these materials has pointed out, designers such as Northrop are not entirely blind; they see where they want to go and by what means they propose to get there. What they cannot do, if their idea is novel, is foresee with certainty whether it will work in the sense of meeting all the relevant requirements.37 To make this distinction clear, I will here describe new technological variants as "unforesighted" rather than "blind." Though less than felicitous, this may avoid distraction from the central argument.
The variation-selection model pertains to both the generation of knowledge and the devising of artifacts (which is itself a kind of generation of knowledge, specifically, of how to arrange and proportion a device to accomplish a given task). It thus applies to both engineering research and engineering design. In the story at hand the concern is mainly with design, though, in the end, knowledge will also be seen to be at issue. The overall model also comprises two rather different phases, the first involving variation and selection and the second mainly selection. Though I describe them here in order, in practice they occur intertwined, and developments go on typically back and forth between them. The phases can be denoted, respectively, as hidden and overt. (The jargon is regrettable, but the distinctions are fundamental.) As always, both phases were present necessarily in the landing-gear story.
The hidden phase, as the name implies, takes place out of sight in the designer's mind. How imagined variants arise in this phase raises the usual difficult questions about the creative process. In engineering, it presumably includes search of past experience for solutions that have proved useful in comparable situations, mental incorporation of whatever novel features come to mind as desirable in the current circumstances, plus a certain amount of serendipitous mental brainstorming. The selection activity in this phase entails a mental winnowing of the conceived variants to pick out those that seem most promising. Here thought trials and judgment distilled from experience come into play. Though nominally separate, variation and selection in the hidden phase go on concurrently in a more or less disordered way in the designer's mind, much of it probably at an unconscious level. Out of the hidden phase come visible variants for overt examination. 38 We can only infer, of course, what went through the minds of Northrop and his contemporaries in the hidden phase of their landing-gear work. From his actions and writings concerning the "flying wing," Northrop obviously gave consideration to the gains from retraction. Whether he weighed and discarded the idea of wheel 37E. T. Layton, personal correspondence. 38My book (n. 2 above, pp. 244 and 248) identified the hidden phase entirely with variation (except for a minor qualifying observation) and the overt phase with selection. Inclusion of selection also in the hidden phase strikes me now as more sensible. pants, the evidence does not say. Such thought, likely given the considerable use of that device at the time, could have led to his notion for the more streamlined trouser gear. From the evidence of their airplanes, other designers conceived a variety of variants. Whether they thought of and immediately rejected as harebrained some that we do not even imagine, we most likely will never know. The visible variants that we do know of included trouser gear, retractable gear of various kinds, and a wide variety of gear with wheel pants, some cantilever and some braced, either independently or as part of a wing-support structure.
To the extent that variants from the hidden phase involve novelty, they (as well as those mentally discarded) must be unforesighted in some degree. Activities in the overt phase then seek to deal with this unforesightedness through some kind of visible trial. The designer or design community thus attempts to select from the overt variants those that best (or at least satisfactorily) achieve their goal. The trial may be vicarious, through some representation of the artifact, or direct, through the artifact itself. These trials also subdivide in turn. Vicarious trial can take place by experiment with models or other reproductions of the artifact or by analytical "tests"-that is, theoretical calculations-on paper.39 Direct trial can be supplied deliberately by proof test of the completed artifact and will come inevitably through everyday use. Usually in combination, these types of trial provide the means for overt selection.
Northrop and the design community followed such selection procedure as best they could for the landing gear. As we have seen, the trade-off between aerodynamic performance and weight could have been tested vicariously by theoretical calculation. Whether designers actually did so cannot be known. 
24
Walter G. Vincenti Orion). Largely on the basis of the wind-tunnel trials, Northrop selected trouser gear for his Greek-letter aircraft, a choice that proved short-lived. As experience accumulated from everyday use-and speeds went up steeply from a synergistic combination of engine and airframe innovations--the design community, including Northrop himself, departed permanently from trouser and other fixed gear; using a combination of vicarious and direct trial, it selected retractable gear for the long-term solution.
Unforesighted variation and selective retention thus appear clearly-of necessity, apparently-in the landing-gear story. Designers, coping with day-to-day problems, thought up a variety of solutions in a process that could not help but be unforesighted as to its eventual outcome. No one in the early 1930s, including as prescient an innovator as Northrop, could know how much airplane speeds would increase from other causes or how constructional and operational experience would work out. Through a complex collective process, the design community nonetheless arrived at a solution. By the late 1930s, it had selected the retractable gear for permanent retention.
Within the variation-selection framework, Northrop's trouser gear, far from an anomaly, was part of the necessary learning process. By their unforesighted nature, different variants oftentimes have to be tried. Some will fail outright, some will work well enough for a while, and some may be selected to have a permanent place in engineering practice. All help engineers to learn. When the future is largely unforeseeable, as it always is to the participants, no other way is possible (short of revelation, which engineers cannot count on).
In the end, the variation-selection process produced more than a type of artifact. As airplane speeds continued to increase, the need to reduce drag became overwhelming in the design trade-offs. One can, of course, propel a fixed gear through the air at any speed with sufficient power. The design community learned, however, that, all things considered, the problem is best solved by retraction. The variation-selection process thus provided in the end a piece of fundamental engineering knowledge-that an airplane for the speed range above, say, 250 mph should have a retractable landing gear. This injunction constitutes engineering knowledge in the sense, noted by Herbert Simon, that it describes how an artifact ought to be to perform its task (in contrast to scientific knowledge, which describes how something innately is).40 Though engineers nowadays take it for granted, it had to be learned at some time.
Looked at from the present-day realization that drag turned out to be determinative, the injunction for retractable gear can be seen to embody a kind of technical imperative (or logic).41 Such an imperative, however, though real in light of the eventual increase in flight speeds, was not evident to designers at the time, who could not foresee for sure how far airplane development would lead or how the nonaerodynamic requirements would work out. That is not to say that certain people did not anticipate the outcome earlier than others. Research and design engineers can be found in the early 1930s, I am sure, who thought and stated that adoption of retractable gear was inevitable. Esteem for heroes, however, should not cause us to neglect or gloss over the necessity for and nature of the variation-selection processwould-be prophets do not always turn out to be correct. I recall that circa 1970 some capable and experienced engineers held the view, on apparently rational grounds, that the rotary internal-combustion engine (the Wankel engine) would replace the piston engine for much automotive use. Because of air pollution and other practical problems that were not foreseen and had to be found through trial, things have not worked out that way. Today the views are forgotten, and the engine finds little application. That the prophets for retractable gear were more prescient than those for the rotary engine is true, but we see this after the fact. Since engineers had never been down either passageway before, neither group could foresee for sure what the outcome would be. If today we see the retractable gear as having a technical imperative, it is because of the learning process the design community went through.42
As illustrated by the landing-gear story, the variation-selection process serves for two sorts of problems, specific and generic. Northrop used the process in selecting his trouser gear from the variants that occurred to him and, later, in shifting to retraction; he did so to solve specific problems for particular airplanes. The design community followed the process to find out whether high-speed airplanes as a whole ought or ought not to have retractable gear; by doing so it solved a generic problem for a class of aircraft. In the generation of might be defined in a tenuous sense as "social," but engineers experience them as just as much technical as weight and aerodynamic performance. Cost, an economic and thus a social factor, may have had influence in specific cases early on; it shows no evidence of being a serious problem, however, and apparently played no role in the generic decision for retraction. Nothing appears either of the kinds of concerns that Pinch and Bijker find in different social groups involved in the variation-selection process leading to the normal configuration for the bicycle in the late 1800s-antagonism to the device, alternative societal uses, moral conflicts, attitudes toward and requirements of the sexes, and so forth. One looks also in vain for what those authors call "interpretive flexibility," that is, the different ways that different social groups think of or construe the device, which can play a role in design decisions.46 To designers, as well as users of the device, the landing gear was simply a means for getting the airplane on and off the ground, and that was that. I think it fair to conclude that social considerations had little or nothing to do with shaping the form of the solution to the landing-gear problem.
Not so with regard to direction. A prime consideration pushing designers in the course they took was clearly the value put on speed by modern society, both to get people from place to place as quickly as possible and to maximize return on capital invested in the vehicle. Speed also has its obvious military uses. The direction of the variationselection process leading to retractable gear was thus socially shaped. Once the direction had been set, however, technical considerations took over in shaping the form of the outcome, that is, in leading the design community to settle in the end on retraction. The fact that the imperative for retractable gear was not known ahead of time, but had to be learned in the course of the variation-selection process, does not alter this conclusion. For the landing-gear problem of the 1930s, the direction for design was shaped by social considerations; the form of the resulting artifact by technical.
The situation for the landing gear is fairly straightforward. For other devices, it may (or may not) be less so. As I have pointed out elsewhere, for a contrivance like the airplane, which is in reality a complex system, the structure of design is inherently hierarchical.47 46Pinch and Bijker, pp. 17-50. These authors also include under interpretive flexibility the different material ways in which an artifact can be designed (i.e., arranged). I think it more realistic and meaningful to regard these as technical possibilities or options rather than instances of "interpretive flexibility" (though the two categories are not completely unrelated). (By project definition we mean the initiating translation of some ill-defined, usually qualitative need into concrete specifications for the hardware.) Design of a subcomponent, such as a hydraulic actuator for a retractable gear, takes place at a lower level. Such a multilevel, hierarchical relationship, which is typical of complex devices, has unavoidable consequences for designers. Decisions at one level place technical constraints (or requirements) on design at lower levels, and these constraints tend to become more numerous and rigid the farther down the hierarchy one goes; that is, the degree of technical constraint becomes higher.48 I have argued that, as a consequence, the scope for-and hence likelihood of--social considerations shaping the form of the engineering outcome tend correspondingly to decrease. The retractable landing gear fits this pattern. Indeed, at this middle level of hierarchy, technical considerations took over completely in fixing the form of the solution. The day-to-day interactions of the design community were highly social, as they invariably are. These interactions, however, like the social concerns mentioned earlier, did not generate the considerations on which design decisions depended.49
The situation for other airplane components and at other levels of hierarchy invites conjecture. Among the components involved in the airframe revolution, wing flaps and the controllable-pitch propeller would, I suspect, prove much the same as here, as would the stressedskin aspect of the new aluminum structure. The move to metal itself, however-since stressed skin can be and was accomplished with wood-is a different matter. Eric Schatzberg contends, convincingly I believe, that an existing cultural ideology for the superiority of metal The situation at the levels of project definition and overall design will require study.52 For the former, as for all levels, the social value of speed obviously shaped the direction of design in the 1930s; so also did a socially motivated desire for increased carrying capacity and therefore size. Even in project definition, however, the resulting specifications (the equivalent here of form) had to be limited by technical considerations of what was realistically possible.53 In conceptual design, where overall form of the vehicle was set, the situation probably reached greatest complexity. Requirements of structural integrity, high-speed movement in three dimensions, and, most of all, weight-plus the natural hazards of flying-put more numerous and more rigid technical requirements on airplanes than on most devices. These impose severe constraints at all levels of design, including conceptual. In the airframe revolution, changes in middle-level components in the interest of greater vehicle speed and size also influenced conceptual design strongly from below. Such constraint from lower levels is typical in periods of radical change, when the normal configuration for a device is in flux.54 How much room social shaping could and did have to affect form at the level of conceptual design will need investigation. A full reassessment of the airframe ~5Since structure pertains to the entire airplane, structural design can be taken to lie at a higher level of hierarchy than that of a specific component. The change to metal also constituted (see n. 49 above) a definitely radical design departure. A low degree of technical constraint is thus consistent with the diagram cited in that note (though the precise reasons would need examination).
52In the early stages of a technological change, levels may not divide so neatly in practice. They can still serve as framework for analysis, however.
53"Aspirations" might be more accurate than "specifications" in the instance of a revolution.
54For the concept of normal configuration, see Vincenti, What Engineers Know (n. 2 above), pp. 209-11, 243. revolution in terms of design decisions and how they were arrived at by the design community offers a worthy project.55
For devices less technically demanding than the airplane, the notion of technical constraint suggests that social shaping of form may extend farther down the hierarchy. As indicated earlier, Pinch and Bijker find interpretive flexibility by different social groups playing a central role in shaping the normal configuration of the bicycle (an example at the level of conceptual design). They also make a case that interpretive flexibility regarding purpose had influence in adoption of even such a low-level subcomponent as the pneumatic tire.56 We can expect as a general trend, I believe, that social shaping of form will diminish in systemic devices as the level of design moves lower in the hierarchy. At what levels and how suddenly the decrease occurs, however, may be very different for different devices. As with the pneumatic bicycle tire, departures from the trend also doubtless exist. Fortunately for historians, the situation is fascinatingly complex.57
In light of this complexity-and the findings for the retractable gear-caution may be wise. In the current enthusiasm for the social shaping of technology, we could be in danger of forgetting or downplaying the fact that there is such a thing as technical shaping. Perhaps we should speak of the technosocial shaping of technology and visualize the range of considerations in design as a kind of spectrum, with purely social at one end, purely technical at the other, and a varying mixture between. A challenge would then be to assess where in the spectrum a given case falls. To do this, the realities of hierarchy and the distinction between direction of design and form of engineering outcome may be useful. Distinguishing between specific and generic problems may also help. variation-selection procedures), devised trouser gear, wheel pants, and retractable gear. In doing so, they provided at the same time variants for the generic landing-gear problem. The variants, by the nature of things, could not help but be unforesighted; though some designers might view drag as theoretically controlling, no one could foresee for sure how practical requirements would work out. As speeds went up and reduction in drag became overriding, the design community in the end, through practical ingenuity and cumulative decision, selected retraction for the long-term generic solution. Though the social desire for speed shaped the direction for this change, a technical imperative can now be seen to have shaped its form. In solving the generic problem, Northrop's trouser gear, far from an anomaly, was an integral part of the learning process. Variation-selection in more or less such pattern, I suggest, supplies the methodology for long-term solution of general engineering problems. Where an overriding technical imperative does not exist (which may constitute even the majority of cases), social shaping may well be crucial, but still within a variation-selection framework when the problem is new to engineering experience.58
Epilogue
Pinch and Bijker, in their social-constructivist discussion of the bicycle, point to the importance of including all relevant variants in analyzing a variation-selection episode; the quotations cited earlier from Williams and Edge imply the same. To find all, one must look, not only for the successes and failures, but also for the also-rans. These last, which were brought home to me initially by examination of the Davis wing,59 are the variants that work well enough for a while but, for one reason or another, disappear from the scene. Northrop's trouser gear was of this sort. All play a role in the technological learning process.
This implication of the variation-selection model may have value for historians of technology. A pitfall for all historians, of course, is that we know the outcome of the events we study. This knowledge cannot help but color our selection and interpretation of those events. Historians of technology need to be especially alert to this pitfall since technological problems, to a greater degree than social ones, often find solutions that a majority of people regard as in some sense "correct." As in the usual view of the retractable landing gear, the 
